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equivalent status of a legitimate child and, therefore, at the time of
the marriage of such mother, her husband would become the legitimate stepfather of a legitimate stepchild. Such would not be the result, says Judge Taft, should the father of an illegitimate child marry
a woman other than that child's mother and in such case, asserts the
judge, such illegitimate child should not receive the benefits of section
2105.06 (I).
STATUTE OF FRAUDS

The provisions of Ohio Revised Code section 2107.04 constitute
a special statute of frauds relative to agreements to make wills. This
section provides that no agreement to make a will, or to make a devise
or bequest by will, shall be enforceable unless the same is in writing.
In the case of Frantz v. Maher,3 5 the plaintiff asked for a money
judgment in an amount equal to the value of personal property which
plaintiff would have received had decedent performed her alleged
oral agreement not to make a will, but to die intestate. The court of
appeals, reversing the judgment of the common pleas court rendered
upon the pleadings, held that section 2107.04 of the Ohio Revised
Code has no application to, and does not render unenforceable, an
oral agreement not to make a will, but to die intestate.
GEORGE N. ARONOFF

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
The year 1959 can best be described as one of transition. Major
legislative changes in the Workmen's Compensation Law were enacted, comparable to the extensive 1927 and 1955 amendments.' Although a detailed discussion of the changes is beyond the scope of this
article, suffice it to say that substantive changes, such as redefining
"injury" for compensation purposes, limit the importance of 1959
court decisions which follow the rule set down in Dripps v. Industrial
Commission.2 The Dripps rule, that "injury" comprehends a physical or traumatic damage or harm accidental in character, or a sudden,
unexpected, chance mishap, will be applicable only to injuries incurred
prior to November 2, 1959, the effective date of the amendments.
In 1959, the Ohio Supreme Court, relying upon the Dripps rule, twice
denied compensation for injuries resulting from stress and strain.3
With regard to injuries incurred on or after November 2, 1959, however, the courts must interpret and apply the new legislative definition, which makes a compensable "injury" one caused by4 external, accidental means, or one accidental in character and result.

35. 106 Ohio App. 465, 155 N.E.2d 471 (1957).
p. 379 supra.

See also discussion in Equity section,
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COMPENSATION AWARD

Perhaps the most significant judicial decision of last year was Gee

v. Horvath.5 In this case the court held that the negligence of a fellow-employee can be the basis of a tort suit by an employee, even

though he has been awarded workmen's compensation benefits arising out of the same incident. The Ohio Supreme Court had indicated
that this might be the case just a year before, in Ellis v. Garwood.6
In the Ellis case, the New York compensation law, which bars tort
actions against a co-employee, was held not to apply to an Ohio accident when both employees were non-residents of Ohio. The court,
in the Gee case, acknowledged that some ambiguity in the tort action
rule had arisen because of the Ellis decision. Prior to this, the supreme court, in Morrow v. Hume,7 had allowed a tort action for the
death of an employee in a suit brought by the employee's dependents
against a co-employee, based upon his negligent driving. An earlier
decision, Landrum v. Middaugh,' had denied any tort action by a compensated employee against the negligent foreman who caused the injury. The Gee case followed Morrow v. Hume and specifically overruled Landrum. One judge in the Gee case felt that this overruling
was erroneous because the Landrum case could be distinguished on the
basis that the foreman is the alter ego of the employer and should be
cloaked with the employer's immunity from tort liability in compensation situations.' The other judges declined to recognize this distinction.
INJURY ARISING IN

THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT

The issue of when an injury or death arises out of and in the
course of employment was considered by the courts in several cases
last year. A machine shop clean-up man was found on a plant road
at a point between his work station and the employer's hospital. He
was unconscious, suffering from a broken leg and fractured skull. He
died shortly thereafter. On the basis of these facts, plus the presumption against suicide, the appellate court affirmed the dependent's
right to participate in workmen's compensation." Another worker
1. Schroeder, Legislative Enactments to Ohio Workmen's Compensation in 1959, 20 OHIo
ST. L.J. 601 (1959).
2. 165 Ohio St. 407, 135 N.E.2d 873 (1956).
3. Davis v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 168 Ohio St. 482, 155 N.E.2d 889 (1959); Carbone v. General Fireproofing, 169 Ohio St. 258, 159 N.E.2d 227 (1959).
4. OHio REV. CODE § 4123.01(C) (Supp. 1959).
5. 169 Ohio St. 14, 157 N.E.2d 354 (1959).
6. 168 Ohio St. 241, 152 N.E.2d 100 (1958), 10 WEsT. RES. L. REV. 318 (1959).
7. 131 Ohio St. 319, 3 N.E.2d 39 (1936).
8. 117 Ohio St. 608, 160 N.E. 691 (1927).
9. 169 Ohio St. 14, 18, 157 N.E.2d 354, 357 (1959) (concurring opinion).
10. Pilak v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 162 N.E.2d 201 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
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fell while cleaning canopies, fractured his skull, and died. He was
working three feet from a 350 degree oven from which heat was escaping through cracks. He normally worked in a 78 to 80 degree
environment. Even on the day of the incident the temperature in
the rest of the plant was only about 100 degrees. The court of appeals held that on these facts it becomes a jury question whether the
worker's death was compensable by being within the employment relation." In another case, an office manager for an insurance company was killed while driving his car. On several prior days he had
gone to a neighboring city to aid in the opening of a new office. When
he went to his regular office he usually arrived about 8:00 a. m. He
was killed at 7:30 a. m. at an intersection located between his home
town and the neighboring city. His briefcase, containing employer's
papers and his IBM pencil, was in the car. This pencil he rarely took
from his office except for business purposes. On this evidence, his
12
dependents were permitted to participate in compensation benefits.
MEDICAL PROOF TO SUBSTANTIATE

CLAIM

No year passes without judicial decisions on the weight of medical proof necessary to substantiate a workmen's compensation claim.
In 1959, the supreme court twice denied compensation when the accidental injury aggravated a pre-existing disease, but the medical proof
failed to demonstrate that the accident substantially accelerated the
time of death. 3 Also, the medical proof for 25 per cent loss of vision
was held inadequate for a permanent partial award when based solely
upon claimant's testimony that, soon after the bit of steel flew into
his eye, he had to wear glasses for the first time; that later, when he
closed the injured eye, it felt as if grit were present; and that still
later, when he closed his other eye, he could see nothing out of the
injured eye.'4
PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION

A constant issue in workmen's compensation centers on what act
constitutes "payment of compensation or benefits awarded on account
of injury."' 5 Continuing jurisdiction in the Industrial Commission
exists for ten years from the date of the last such payment. When
an injured employee of a self-insurer was provided an infra-red ray
lamp to relax her muscles and relieve pain through self-administered
home treatment, the supreme court held no medical treatment was in11. Donlin v. Industrial Comm'n, 155 N.E.2d 459 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
12. Finnegan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 162 N.B.2d 216 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
13. Messe v. Wylie, 169 Ohio St. 252, 158 N.E.2d 891 (1959) (coronary disease); Senvisky v. Truscon Steel Div., Republic Steel Corp., 168 Ohio St. 523, 156 N.E.2d 724 (1959)
(Hodgkin's disease).
14. Tate v. Young, 162 N.E.2d 134 (Ohio Ct.App. 1959).
15. Omo REv. CODE § 4123.52.
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volved which would invoke the ten year period from the date of this
event. 6
PROCEDURE

In the area of procedure, one case held that a question on cross
examination in a personal injury damage suit which evoked an unresponsive answer indicating the plaintiff had received workmen's compensation for a prior injury was no basis for error. 1 7 The provision
which prohibits calling to the jury's attention the amount of compen-

sation applies only to proceedings under the compensation act. 18
Claimant's request for a special instruction which included the
phrase "which proximately contributed to her present disability," was
correctly refused by the trial court.' 9 The issue of "present disability" must not be assumed. It is a jury question, so the request was
improper.
The new appeals provisions of the 1955 amendments were discussed in three cases. The employer can appeal from a ruling of the
Industrial Commission to the common pleas court because Ohio Revised Code section 4123.519 so provides.20 The employer can also
appeal directly to the common pleas court from an adverse ruling by
the Board of Review, without going to the Industrial Commission.2
However, there was some question as to whether a decision of the
administrator adverse to the claimant was appealable directly to common pleas court prior to review by the Industrial Commission. 2 A
4123.519 clarified
1959 amendment to Ohio Revised Code section
23
the law by expressly allowing such an appeal.
Silicosis Claims
Silicosis claims, with their special procedural requirements, resulted in a large number of judicial decisions. Last year, the Industrial Commission successfully resisted a mandamus action brought to
compel it to change a rule charging the cost of a silicosis claim as of
the date of total disability, not the date of the injury. 4 Under Ohio
16. Cestone v. Wylie, 169 Ohio St. 182, 158 N.E.2d 520 (1959).
17. Ricks v. Jackson, 108 Ohio App. 466, 162 N.E.2d 539 (1958), affd, 169 Ohio St. 254,
159 N.E.2d 225 (1959).
18. OHIo REV. CODE § 4123.93.
19. McCarthy v. Young, 161 N.E.2d 546 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
20. Holland Furnace Co. v. Schneider, 160 N.E.2d 132 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
21. Wine v. Summer & Co., 154 N.E.2d 674 (Ohio C.P. 1956).
22. See Moore v. General Motors Corp., 154 N.E.2d 468 (Ohio C.P. 1957), aff'd, 154
N.E.2d 98 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957), decided under Ohio Revised Code § 4123.519 prior to its
amendment in 1959.
23. See Administrative Law and Procedure section, p. 337 supra.
24. State ex rel. Superior Foundry Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 168 Ohio St. 537, 156 N.E.2d
742 (1959).
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Revised Code section 4123.68 (W), specific authority for such discretionary rule in silicosis claims overrides the general language of
paragraph two in the introductory portion of section 4123.68. When
a silicosis claimant files his petition in a common pleas court on appeal, he must aver the first date on which a medical doctor diagnosed
the disease; otherwise a motion to make definite and certain will be
sustained. 25 In another case, a claimant had complained of shortness
of breath and a chest condition since 1949, with periodic examinations at the county tuberculosis clinic. He was not diagnosed as silicotic by the physician until April 1955, and his claim action was filed
in June 1955. In a mandamus action it was held that the claim must
be accepted."' The remedial statutes are liberally construed and here
the claimant filed within six months from the date of his diagnosis,
which met the statutory requirement.
The supreme court last year also construed Ohio Revised Code
section 4123.68 (W), which provides a specific procedure in silicosis
claims, as superseding section 4123.10, which is a general statute providing that rules of evidence are not binding on the commission. The
Industrial Commission may demand a medical examination by silicosis
referees. If there is no record of such demand, no inference is permitted that such was made. In State ex rel. Fulton Foundry & Machine Company v. Industrial Commission,2 the Board of Review reversed the deputy administrator's denial of a silicosis claim on the
basis of new evidence contained in an ordinary letter. Since there was
no demand on the record for an examination by silicosis referees, the
allowance of the claim could not be re-examined. Thus, a request for
mandamus ordering reconsideration was denied. A concurring opinion, supported by four judges, interpreted sections 4123.516-.518,
which require prompt hearings and decisions, as authority for the
Board of Review to decide the claim without referring new evidence
back to the silicosis referees. 29 Two dissenting judges were of the
opinion that section 4123.10 required full medical review of any new
evidence.3 0
ANCILLARY ISSUES
When an employer insuring under the state insurance fund seeks
to attack the merit rating set for the company by the Industrial Commission, mandamus will not lie unless an abuse of discretion is
25. State ex rel. Maxwell v. Industrial Comm'n, 159 NB.2d 375 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
26. State ex rel, Maxwell v. Industrial Comm'n, 160 N..2d 346 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
See also discussion in Administrative Law and Procedure section, p. 339 supra.
27. OHIO REV. CODE § 4123.68(W).
28. 168 Ohio St. 410, 155 N.E.2d 898 (1959).
29. Id. at 414, 155 NE.2d at 901 (concurring opinion).
30. Id. at 415, 155 N.E.2d at 902 (dissenting opinion).
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proved. 3 1 Because merit rating is a complex actuarial function, the
Commission is deemed to have wide discretionary powers.
32
One case, involving lawyer's fees in compensation proceedings,
held that no part of the attorney's fees can be paid out of the compensation awarded the claimant.33 Furthermore, an order from the
Commission allowing $750 as attorney's fees for legal services rendered before the Industrial Commission was deemed adequate. In a
claim sounding in quantum meruit, the lawyer had requested an additional amount measured by the value of legal services performed. In
a mandamus action, the court upheld the Commission's denial of this
request, recognizing that the attorney had already received $932
based upon a private contract with the claimant. The award granted
the claimant, which resulted from the lawyer's services, was for permanent disability at $100 a month, in addition to the amount already
allowed for temporary disability.
OLIVER SCHROEDER, JR.
31.
32.
33.

State ex rel. H. K. Porter Co. v. Klapp, 159 N.E.2d 360 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
State ex rel. Rice v. Industrial Conmn'n, 155 N.E.2d 70 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
OHIO REV. CODE § 4123.06.

